← Dawn of the Planet of the Apes
Dawn of the Planet of the Apes poster

Dawn of the Planet of the Apes · essays & theory

2014 · Matt Reeves

A reading · through the lens of theory

The film opens on a hunt, and for a long time nobody speaks.

Wet forest in the hills above San Francisco. Grey light, rain in the branches, apes spread across a slope and closing on deer, orders passed down the line in signs. It runs longer than a studio picture is normally willing to go without dialogue. By the end of it you know the whole society: who leads, who defers, who is young enough to be reckless, what happens to a body that breaks formation. Nothing was explained. All of it was carried by posture.

Deleuze has a name for that kind of showing. He calls it the gest: not a gesture in the sense of a signal, but an attitude a body holds that makes a social relation visible, so you read a political order off the way someone stands. He found it in theatrical and ceremonial cinema. Here it belongs to a summer tentpole, and the bodies are synthetic. In that opening the pack also registers as one thing, a single unit of appetite and alarm rather than a group of individuals — Deleuze's dividual, the crowd rendered as one affective body. The rest of the film is the work of breaking it apart.

Now the harder claim. Dawn is a movement-image film, straight through: a character perceives a situation, acts to change it, and the editing exists to keep that chain legible. Deleuze thought postwar cinema had to break this circuit, because after 1945 nobody could believe an act reliably transforms a situation. So calling Dawn a fine action film sounds like faint praise, a compliment to a form that was supposed to be exhausted. It isn't. Reeves runs the machine at full power and honestly, all the way to the end, where it disproves its own founding premise from inside.

The architecture is the large form: a vast situation presses on people until someone acts decisively and the situation is transformed. Its encompassing milieu — the synsign — is built as two contrasting physical worlds. Vertical, organic, timber and firelight in the redwoods. Horizontal, ruined-industrial, in a city being reclaimed by rot. Between them a hydroelectric dam that both sides need. The film breathes the way Westerns breathe, alternating the huge overcast milieu with the taut line of the standoff, and it borrows the Western's furniture wholesale: water rights, a fragile treaty, a fort under siege.

What Reeves does with the binomial — Deleuze's force-against-force, hero facing his opposite — is the film's real move. The duel isn't ape against human. It's Caesar against Koba, inside one camp, while the mirror duel plays out among the humans. Caesar wins his fight. He inherits a war. The large form promises that the decisive act restores the world; here the act is performed, correctly, by the right person, and the world tips over anyway.

Koba earns his own concept. Deleuze's naturalism reads certain acts as symptoms, surfacings of a drive laid down elsewhere in a body's history. Koba is a bonobo whose scars are the record of what human hands did to him in a laboratory, and his insurrection is that history speaking through him. Kebbell plays him as tragic antagonist, not villain. His grievance is comprehensible, which is exactly why it's frightening.

The faces do the rest. Deleuze splits the close-up in two: a reflexive face, a contour that holds and absorbs a quality, thinking; and an intensive face, a series of features climbing toward a threshold. Serkis's Caesar is the first, aging into weariness and moral compromise, a face that receives. Koba is the second, micro-movements gathering until something crosses over. That distinction is only available because Weta, under Joe Letteri, put the entire dramatic load on eyes and micro-expression and — the specific invention here — took performance capture out of the studio volume onto real exteriors, into rain and low light, so both casts stand in the same weather and the same mud.

Which puts a genuine problem to Bazin. His argument for realism rested on the automatic bond between the photograph and the thing that was actually there. A performance-captured ape has no such bond. But Seresin lights the film with low-key, source-motivated naturalism, desaturated greens and greys, and Hoy and Salfas cut for spatial geography rather than fragmentation, so you always know who holds which ground. The realism has migrated from what stood in front of the lens to how light and space behave. That migration is why the apes read as characters instead of effects.

Then the shot everyone remembers: the camera bolted to a rotating tank turret, holding one continuous 360-degree pan through the assault. Deleuze describes an extreme of perception where vision stops belonging to anyone and becomes the way matter sees, the gramme. Here it's literal. The eye turns at the machine's speed, indifferent, and both sides pass through the frame weighted the same. The war looks at itself.

The moral engine, though, is built entirely out of staging. Reeves rhymes the two camps — councils, meetings, domestic scenes — so the parallel is visible only from where you sit. Neither community can see the other making its identical mistake. That's Deleuze's relation-image: sense that lives in a relation no character holds, and the audience is the third party who holds it.

And the apes are a people who do not yet exist. Deleuze's late idea, that in political cinema the people are missing and film's task becomes fabulation, catching a people in the act of inventing itself, is not a metaphor here. Giacchino and the sound team stage the invention acoustically: grunts, signed exchange, then Caesar's halting, hard-won speech, so that one spoken word arrives as an event. “Ape not kill ape” is a law spoken into being. Caesar founds a people by saying it. Then he disproves it himself.

The debts are precise. John Chambers's foam latex in 1968 required a mime-trained actor inside the ape; Weta digitally supersedes the latex while keeping the actor. Conquest (1972) gave the Caesar figure and the uprising. Battle (1973) gave the exact structure — a fragile ape-human peace destroyed by a coup from within. The Two Towers proved with Gollum that a fully CG character could be acted rather than animated, by the same Serkis and the same Letteri. King Kong (2005) was the primate rehearsal, facial musculature and locomotion. Avatar made the feature-length case with head-rig capture. Dawn is where the loan is repaid: the first to carry all of it outdoors, into weather.

Forward it seeds War (2017) and the grave, character-first register Reeves takes into The Batman, and it more or less ends the argument about whether capture is acting. What it did to the blockbuster is rarer. It built a tentpole whose climax is a moral defeat and made that legible without a single line of explanation.

The question it leaves open is the one Caesar can't answer. If becoming a people means acquiring speech, law, and the capacity to break it, then his discovery isn't about apes at all. Watch the hunt again with the sound down. The ending is already in the way they move.

Concepts in play